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This paper investigates which specific regime type is best able to prevent civil war 
recurrence. I theorize that due to the different levels of citizen involvement in each regime type, 
a regime such as a Consensus Democracy with a high level of citizen involvement will be less 
vulnerable to rebellion than a regime with low levels of citizen involvement, such as a 
Strongman Autocracy. I find that the only regime type significantly correlated with the outbreak 
of civil war in a post-conflict state is the Strongman regime. Among the autocratic-leaning 
regimes, I am unable to find any significant results for the personalistic and militaristic factors. 
Among the democratic-leaning regimes, I am also unable to find any significant results for the 
four institutions and democracy consensus scores. Overall, I fount that it is less important to have 
a regime that is best at preventing conflict recurrence, but rather more important to avoid the 
regime type – Strongman Autocracies – that are worst at preventing conflict recurrence.  
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Introduction 
 In the modern era, few events provide countries the ability to establish a completely new 
government like a civil war, making them an enticing solution for unsatisfied citizens. But civil 
wars are inherently destructive forces that harm a country’s economy, political institutions, 
health, and overall standard of living, disrupting the lives of both its citizens and neighbors. 
Given that about half of all countries that suffer through one civil war will experience another, 
one of the most important jobs a post-civil war government has is to prevent conflict recurrence. 
 Political regimes can be categorized by how democratic or authoritarian they are, but this 
one-dimensional sorting ignores the intricacies of how different autocracies and democracies 
actually handle internal political conflict. An autocratic Strongman regime, which relies on a 
single leader’s personality and military power, will likely have a different approach to handling 
dissent than an autocratic Machine regime, in which no one leader has absolute power and the 
party rules over the military. Similarly, a democratic Majoritarian regime, which can ignore 
minority opinion and enables one elected official to have more power, will likely handle dissent 
differently than a democratic Consensus regime, in which minorities have their own institutional 
power and cooperation is necessary for political action. 
 Different regime types, with their own sets of political institutions, handle internal conflict 
differently. Sometimes a country is able to switch regimes without civil war being necessary. 
And sometimes a country returns to the same regime type no matter how many civil wars it has 
experienced. For example, consider the post-WWII experiences of Chad and Thailand.  
 Chad has been embroiled in five destructive civil wars for just under half of the time since 
its independence in 1960. The first Chadian Civil War occurred just five years after 
independence, lasting for six years, before the second broke out in 1980. Chadian politics has 
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been characterized by highly personalistic and authoritarian leaders throughout its modern 
history, with a tendency towards more militaristic leaders in the last half of Chad’s statehood. 
Chad’s cycle of recurring civil wars and unsuccessful dictators has contributed to its ranking as 
the fourth lowest country in the world on the UN’s Human Development Index. 
 Thailand has also had a tumultuous political history. Until 1973, Thailand was led by 
military dictatorships, some more personalistic than others. Its first brush with democracy only 
lasted a few years, however, before the military regained control. Ever since, Thailand has been 
characterized by a rotation of rule by Juntas, a return to democracy triggered by protests, 
Democracies that tend to have more consensus traits (at least in the last few decades), and then 
relatively bloodless coups during periods of instability that lead to another Junta. Despite the 
instability of any one regime, Thailand’s only civil war in the post-WWII period occurred in 
1971-72, right before its first experiment with democracy. 
 Every country has a unique story of war and changing regimes. In my thesis, I attempt to 
find out what kind of government is best able to prevent the bloody cycle of recurring civil wars 
by simplifying each country’s story down to the specific regime type that immediately precedes a 
civil war. 
 The literature on civil wars is extensive. The question of what causes a civil war to occur or 
reoccur has been asked many times, with each author focusing on the economy, political 
institutions, past conflict, demographic makeup, or any number of other factors. The benefits of 
consensus democracies versus majoritarian democracies have also been debated, albeit not with 
the degree of conclusiveness that is present in the civil war literature. However, the closest the 
two spheres of literature come to intersecting is in analyzing the benefits of power-sharing 
institutions in post-conflict states. 
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 In my study, I analyzed the impact of both autocratic and democratic regime subtypes on 
civil war recurrence. In order to do this I categorized each autocratic-leaning regime as a 
Strongman, Boss, Junta, Machine, or Monarchy, and each democratic-leaning regime as 
Majoritarian, Mixed, or Consensus. For the democratic-leaning regimes, I do this by creating a 
consensus score based on four political institutions: legislative type, federalism, executive 
inclusion (or restraint), and executive type. I theorize that the reason each regime type would 
have a different effect on a state’s chances of experiencing conflict recurrence has to do with the 
level of citizen involvement. The more people involved in the political decision-making process, 
the fewer there will be with the incentive to rebel. 
 I find that the effect of regime type on civil war recurrence is only significant for the most 
conflict-prone regimes. Strongman regimes are significantly more likely to trigger recurring civil 
wars. However, the regime types that perform better do not do so significantly relative to each 
other. Within the autocratic-leaning regime types, militaristic and personalistic regimes seem to 
be correlated with conflict recurrence, although this result is not quite at a level of significance. 
Within democratic-leaning regimes, the only significant result is that the federalism indicator is 
significantly correlated with conflict recurrence.  
Literature Review  
 In the post-WWII era, civil war has become increasingly prevalent. There have been 155 
civil wars since 1946 until 2007 (as measured by the Correlates of War dataset). These 155 civil 
wars occurred in 65 countries – just over a third of the 177 countries that existed during that time 
period (as measured by the Polity IV dataset). And 15 of these countries (23 percent) have 
experienced civil war for at least a quarter of their years from 1946 or independence; two 
countries (Angola and Sudan) have experienced civil war for more than half of those years.  
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 As defined by the Correlates of War project, a civil war1 must involve sustained combat 
between organized armed forces and result in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths within a 
12-month period. Furthermore, all sides must be capable of effective resistance - this criterion 
distinguishes civil wars from one-sided mass killings. Civil wars are fought between the state’s 
government and a non-state entity; the state government’s involvement is what distinguishes 
civil wars from other types of intrastate wars. 
 Understanding the definition of a civil war and its importance to the modern international 
community is essential to this paper, as only states that have experienced civil war between 1946 
and 2007 as recorded in the Correlates of War dataset are analyzed. Furthermore, reviewing the 
theorized causes of a civil war’s initial occurrence, termination, and later recurrence is necessary 
to understanding the role regime type plays in conflict recurrence. In the literature on the causes 
of civil wars, a major debate revolves around the role of ethnicity; in the literature on resolving 
civil wars, the issues of negotiated settlements versus military victories and UN Peacekeeping 
involvement are debated; and in the literature on civil war recurrence, the debate focuses on what 
incentives to rebel are most important. 
The role of ethnicity 
 Given the dramatic increase in the number of civil wars following WWII, scholars have 
debated why the new international system is more prone to internal conflict than before. Much of 
the literature follows the Huntingtonian paradigm of attributing conflict to clashing ethnic, 
religious, and cultural identities (Huntington 1996); earlier literature argued for the importance 
of ethnic motivations in modern nationalism (Ignatieff 1993), ethnicity’s historical role in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Correlates of War project differentiates between civil wars and other types of intrastate 
conflict (regional internal wars and intercommunal wars), but for this paper only civil wars are 
measured. After 1946, there was only 1 regional internal war and 11 intercommunal wars. These 
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forming nations (Smith 1986), and promoting ethnicity as the primary way of understanding all 
types of conflict (Moynihan 1993). These arguments were later disputed by empirical studies that 
rejected ethnicity as the primary cause for conflict, and instead looked at economic factors 
(Fearon & Laitin 2003, Collier & Hoeffler 2004). 
 Fearon and Laitin (2003) took a critical look at the conventional wisdom that civil wars 
became so prevalent following WWII due to ethnic and religious antagonisms, and instead argue 
that states are at risk when they have conditions that favor insurgency, such as poverty, political 
instability, rough terrain, and large populations. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) looked at rebellions 
in terms of motive and opportunity, rejecting the classic political science literature that rebellions 
are sufficiently explained by the circumstances that motivate people to rebel – such as ethnic or 
religious divisions – and instead argued that the opportunistic economic capability to rebel is a 
better predictor of civil war.  
 The problem here is that both sides only look at half of the issue – the motive (ethnicity) or 
the opportunity (economic capability) – because they have the disparate goals of asking why 
internal conflicts occur and how to best predict future internal conflicts. But in order to 
understand the whole picture, both motive and opportunity must be taken into account. Denny 
and Walter (2014) do this by recognizing the fact that civil wars are more likely to be initiated by 
ethnic groups than any other type of group. They argue that the ethnic group may be motivated 
by exclusion from political power, creating grievances. The ethnic group has opportunity from 
living together in concentrated spaces and sharing the exclusive ties of culture and language. 
Denny and Walter then add a third factor to the equation that pays homage to Walter’s research 
focus: ethnic groups have fewer incentives to made credible commitments in the negotiation 
process due to the fact that ethnic identity is less elastic than other identities, like political party 
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affiliation. 
 The debate over the role of ethnicity is very important to my hypothesis, as one of the 
primary advantages of consensus democracies is its ability to include minorities like ethnic 
groups in the governmental decision making process. Denny and Walter’s findings emphasize 
the need for an inclusive government that ethnic groups can more credibly commit to. 
Ending the civil war 
 When looking at how civil wars end, the most important objective is how to ensure that the 
war stays finished; after all, over half of all modern civil wars have recurred (Quinn, Mason, & 
Gurses 2007). Civil wars typically end in one of two ways: military victory or a negotiated 
settlement. Conventionally it has been argued that military victories are more likely to result in 
durable peace, due to the fact that negotiated settlement are far more likely to break down than to 
result in a mutually satisfactory solution (Wagner 1993, Licklider 1995, Ohmura 2011).  
 Other studies have clarified or refuted this finding. Mason et al. (2011) found that 
“contrary to the existing literature on civil war outcome and peace duration, negotiated 
settlements do not necessarily produce a more fragile peace than decisive military victories. The 
peace that follows negotiated settlements is more fragile initially but more durable with time.” 
Hartzell et al. (2001) looked at what characteristics make negotiated peace settlements more 
durable in the short term, and identified four factors: when the previous stable regime was a 
democracy, when the conflict was of low intensity over an extended period of time, when 
threatened groups are given territorial autonomy in the peace agreement, and when third party 
states or international organizations have given security assurances to the former combatants. It 
is important to note that one of the characteristics identified, giving territorial autonomy to 
threatened groups, is a key element in consensus democracies - federalism. 
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 Walter (1999) argued that in order for a negotiated settlement to be successful, there must 
be credible guarantees to enforce the terms of the agreement. Even if the original dispute that 
started the civil war is resolved, unless the agreement has an enforcement mechanism civil war 
will resume. The importance of UN Peacekeeping forces in providing this mechanism and 
preventing conflict recurrence has been supported by multiple studies (Walter 2002, Doyle & 
Sambanis 2002, Fortna 2004, Hartzell & Hoddie 2003, Jung 2008). Collier, Hoeffler, and 
Soderbom (2008) found that doubling the PKO expenditure significantly reduced the post-
conflict risk of recurrence, from 40 percent to 31 percent.  
Why civil wars recur 
 Much of the recent literature on civil war recurrence elaborates on the economic and 
political incentives that Walter (2004) identified. Walter first established that the reasons for 
subsequent conflicts are not related to the reasons for the initial civil war, then argued there are 
two key incentives for individuals to rebel: “individual hardship or severe dissatisfaction with 
one’s current situation” and “the absence of any nonviolent means for change.” 
 Omae (2012) studied the issue of citizen hardship, and argued that the government’s 
response to the natural low levels of violence following a civil war determines whether or not the 
war will recur. He finds that the government’s use of both indiscriminate violence against 
noncombatants and selective violence with threats to physical integrity (such as extrajudicial 
killings, torture, or imprisonment) to suppress rebel factions contributes to a higher risk of 
conflict recurrence. Omae argues that third party interveners such as peacekeeping forces are key 
to preventing such violence by the government. 
 Quinn, Mason, and Gurses (2007) analyzed what structural conditions incentivized former 
combatants to start fighting again. They found that rebel victories are less likely to break down 
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than government victories, and negotiated settlements that are supported by peacekeeping forces 
are more stable than government victories. They later nuanced these initial findings to argue that 
rebel victories are only more stable than government victories if the new rebel regime can 
survive its first few years (Mason et al. 2011). Government victories are more stable in the short 
term, but are increasingly fragile as rebel groups have time to reform and rebuild. Negotiated 
peace settlements follow the same pattern as rebel victories - initially fragile but more stable over 
time. 
 However, this research does not take into account the type of regime that the rebels or 
government establish. Following Walter’s (2004) logic, authoritarian governments would yield a 
greater incentive to rebel by not providing a non-violent means for change (such as elections). A 
democratic regime, therefore, would reduce this recurrence risk. The idea that democratic 
governments are less likely to experience civil conflict is explored within the theory of 
democratic peace. 
Democratic Peace and the role of regime types 
 The theory of democratic peace primarily states that pairs of democracies are less likely to 
fight each other than democracy-autocracy pairs or autocracy pairs. More relevant to this paper, 
it also states that democracies are less prone to civil conflict. It is important to note that the 
theory of democratic peace concerns itself with all democracies - while there may be some 
debate over whether a state is democratic or not, there is no distinction between different kinds 
of democracies. Hegre (2014) provides a good overview of the democratic peace literature, and 
concludes that in terms of civil conflict, consolidated democracies have less conflict than semi-
democracies. He also finds support for the idea that both democracies and the existence of peace 
are due to pre-existing socio-economic conditions - with the caveat that economic development 
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alone will not bring lasting peace unless democratic institutions are also present. This finding is 
supported by Haggard and Kaufman’s (1997) argument that new post-civil war democracies of 
previously authoritarian states depend on short-term economic success in order for the 
democracy as a whole to be successful.  
 Some scholars maintain that democracy is bad for new states. Howarth (2014) argues that 
liberalizing post-conflict societies by encouraging democratization and liberal economic policies 
actually produces an environment conducive to inequality, interpersonal violence and crime. 
Howarth establishes a critique of liberal peace by providing empirical evidence that shows 
liberal economic policies create a “disenfranchised mass of citizens who have been incorporated 
into the global economy on unequal terms.” However, Howarth primarily criticizes the economic 
policies associated with democratization, not the regime type itself.  
 Hegre (2014) concluded in his review of the literature on democratic peace that 
democracies are more stable than autocracies, and in turn autocracies are more stable than 
intermediate regimes (or anocracies). Democratic peace theory predicts that the end result of 
rebellions and regime transitions is that all states will become democratic, and then there will be 
no more war. But how does a state that has just emerged from civil conflict become a 
democracy? It is important to keep in mind that the fight to democratize post-conflict states is an 
uphill battle. As Huntington established in his 1968 book Political Order in Changing Societies, 
states newly emerged from a civil war are naturally inclined towards authoritarian regimes, since 
the first priority is for a stable political order rather than promoting the democratic process. And 
despite the research that indicates otherwise (as reviewed in Hegre 2014), authoritarian regimes 
can be perceived to be more stable than democracies. 
 In response to Huntington’s theory, Jung (2008a) looks at why democratization in post-
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civil war states has often failed. She finds that democratization is most successful when the civil 
war is resolved by negotiated settlement, when a UN Peacekeeping operation is present, and 
when there is a fast economic recovery. Jung finds that when these factors are present, post-
conflict states are 23 times more likely to form democracies. She later argues (Jung 2008b) that 
following a civil war, “political institutions well designed to end civil war are not necessarily as 
effective for promoting democratic governance;” because while power-sharing arrangements can 
help the warring parties reach a negotiated agreement, if those power-sharing institutions are 
created too soon after the war’s end they can lock the wartime divisions into the post-war 
democratic government.  
The role of power sharing institutions  
 For the most part, democracies are agreed to be the best regime type for any state, 
including post-conflict states. What is not agreed upon, however, is the institutional framework 
for the new democracy. Power sharing institutions, the key component of consensus 
democracies, are a hotly debated topic. 
 Jung’s theory, which discredits power-sharing institutions, is contradicted by Gurses and 
Mason’s (2008) findings. They argue that negotiated settlements are more likely to result in 
democratization than a military victory by either side - but that the presence of UN PKOs does 
not produce higher levels of democracy. Gurses and Mason also argue for incorporating power 
sharing between the former combatants. They find that the process of fighting in the civil war 
and then negotiating a settlement tends to result in a more balanced field of contenders, which 
makes it is easier to incorporate power sharing institutions into the newly formed democracy. 
 Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) also tested the effect of power sharing. They test power-
sharing’s effect on enduring peace along four dimensions - political, territorial, military, and 
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economic. Hartzell and Hoddie found that the more dimensions of power sharing there are 
between former combatants, the more stable the peace. They argue that this is because 
establishing a multidimensional network of power-sharing institutions results in a self-enforcing 
peace, allowing the former combatants to share a sense of security within the new government.  
Elections in the context of ethnic conflict 
 The election system is an explicitly political institution that can incorporate power sharing, 
and can often make or break the success of a new democracy. Consensus democracies are 
defined by a multi-party proportional representation system for elections, while majoritarian 
democracies are defined by a two-party plurality (“first past the post”) system. The danger of a 
majoritarian style democracy and election is especially important in the context of ethnicity’s 
role in civil wars, as famously argued in Michael Mann’s The Dark Side of Democracy. Mann 
theorized that the modern phenomenon of frequent and extremely deadly ethnic cleansing, often 
occurring in the context of ethnically based civil wars, is the result of the majority ethnic group’s 
rule being justified by the popularity of majoritarian democracy in this age. When one ethnic 
group rules over the others, creating a environment of oppression and exploitation, the minority 
group(s) will likely fight back, instigating a cycle of retaliation and radicalization, eventually 
resulting in murderous ethnic cleansing (Mann 2005). 
 Cederman, Gleditsch, and Hug (2013) built off of Mann’s work by using an ethnicity-
based approach to elections in order to respond to the literature that argues elections increase the 
risk of conflict. They find there is only a weak relationship between elections and conflict, 
although the risk does increase under certain circumstances: ethnic groups are more likely to 
engage in conflict after competitive elections, especially the first two held in the newly 
democratic state. They theorize that this is due to the “sore loser” effect, which is not present in 
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noncompetitive elections. After the first two elections, the risk of conflict is minimal. However, 
unlike Mann, they do not distinguish between different election systems.  
The consociationalist approach 
 Consociationalism is a relatively new approach to democracy that has been pioneered by 
Arend Lijphart and his intellectual successors over the past half-century. Inspired by his native 
country, the Netherlands, Lijphart first laid out the consociationalist approach in The Politics of 
Accommodation (Lijphart 1968), and then expanded his theory to be applicable to democracies at 
large (beyond the initial deviant case study) that were deeply divided along ethnic, religious, 
cultural, or linguistic lines in Democracy in Plural Societies (Lijphart 1977). This initial 
groundbreaking work culminated in a quantitative analysis that categorized all established 
democracies as having either majoritarian or consensus traits (Lijphart 1984), initially in 21 
states but later expanded to 36 (1999, 2nd ed. 2012). An overview of Lijphart’s work and how it 
has contributed to later scholarship on consensus democracy can be found in Democracy and 
Institutions  : the Life Work of Arend Lijphart (Crepaz 2000), a homage to Lijphart by his fellow 
consociational scholars – both former graduate students (Markus Crepaz, Thomas Koeble, David 
Wilsford, Andrew Reynolds) and contemporaries (G. Bingham Powel Jr., Bernard Grofman, 
Rein Taagepera, Milton Esman, Jack Nagel). Consensus democracy is the successor to the more 
limited (and highly criticized) consociational democracy, and is designed to be applicable to any 
society, divided or not. Lijphart argues that consensus regimes are even more democratic than 
the more common majoritarian regimes, because of its emphasis on protecting minorities.  
The question of how to apply consensus democratic principles to the constitutional 
framework of a fragile and divided post-conflict state is answered by Andrew Reynolds in 
Designing Democracy in a Dangerous World (Reynolds 2011). Reynolds takes a medical 
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approach to these fragile states, and proposes a treatment plan that utilizes Lijphart’s consensus 
principles. He focuses primarily on electoral systems as the most important institution to 
incorporate power sharing into the new government, and applies his theoretical framework to a 
quantitative analysis of 66 “country-patients.” Reynolds concludes that “simply imposing 
American- or European-style democratic institutions in the developing world is a recipe for 
disaster,” and instead these new democracies should take advantage of the “broad menu of 
electoral and governance arrangements, which can be crafted to the needs of a given society.” 
The consociational approach is innovative and new, and has attracted both enthusiastic 
support and criticism. Earlier critics argue that the basis for Lijphart’s theory – his experience in 
the Netherlands – is tautological and not applicable to other divided societies (Barry 1975, van 
Schendelen 1984). Others criticize his quantitative analysis, and argue that his coding and 
methodology are flawed, resulting in an “empirical overextension of consociational models” 
(Lustick 1979, 1997). Although many of these criticisms are addressed in Lijphart’s later works, 
more recent criticisms argue that governmental systems should not institutionalize wartime 
societal divisions, and the applicability of consociationalism in post-conflict states is extremely 
limited (Jung 2008b, 2013). 
The consensus model for post-conflict states deserves a closer look 
 Although the theory and quantitative support for consensus-style democracies is 
compelling, it is by no means conclusive. It is also almost exclusively compared to majoritarian 
democracies, and not other regime types. The review of the civil war literature shows that 
limiting incentives for individuals to rebel is vital to preventing recurrence, and the post-conflict 
government has a great deal of control over those incentives. In this paper I will test which 
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specific type of government is best able to limit incentives to rebel, and is thus best suited to 
prevent conflict recurrence in the vulnerable post-civil war state. 
Theory 
The debate surrounding the consensus versus majoritarian framework presents a new way 
to evaluate political institutions in post-civil war states, in much the same way that Slater’s new 
subcategories for authoritarian regimes (2003) presented a new way to evaluate the initiation of 
interstate conflict (Weeks 2012). Not all democracies are the same, just as not all autocracies are 
the same. In order to evaluate all regime types along a single scale, a different dimension for 
evaluating these regimes is required. Slater’s (2003) dimensions for distinguishing autocracies 
are who makes the decisions and who executes the decisions, or despotic and infrastructural 
power. Lijphart’s (1999) dimensions for distinguishing democracies are how likely a single 
group can control the entire government and how easily the group in power can change policy.  
Both theorists are essentially looking at how individual citizens, working within the 
existing institutional framework, can affect the lives of other citizens. This first group of citizens 
– those making governmental decisions - could conceivably consist of anywhere between a 
single individual and the entire population, while the second group consists of the entire 
citizenry. When the first group of citizens includes only a small percentage of the population, 
there is a low level of citizen involvement. When the first group of citizens includes a large 
percentage of the population, there is a high level of citizen involvement. Citizen involvement 
can be minimal, such as casting a vote or discussing policy, or it can be significantly more 
involved, such as campaigning for elections or protesting government policies.  
By evaluating political regimes through this dimension of citizen involvement, it is easier 
to connect regime type with the likelihood of civil war recurrence. By definition, a civil war 
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requires a large number of citizens to be involved, on both sides of the conflict. As regimes can 
be ranked according to the level of citizen involvement – with a regime’s type determining the 
institutional allowance for citizen involvement – and a civil war requires a certain level of citizen 
involvement, this dimension of citizen involvement provides the logical link between the key 
variables of regime type and civil war recurrence. 
Why Citizen Involvement 
 There are many different ways to measure and classify regimes, and therefore many 
dimensions through which to evaluate how political institutions effect civil war occurrence. 
However, that field narrows when considering the issue of civil war recurrence. A post-conflict 
state is fragile, and equally likely to fall back into conflict as not. Therefore, a different standard 
must be used to evaluate post-conflict states. The motive vs opportunity framework is a classic 
way of predicting conflict. In a state that has already experienced a civil war, the opportunity 
aspect is essentially a pre-existing condition. Opportunity, or having the capital, manpower, and 
strategic resources to conduct a war, continues to exist in some capacity after the first civil war. 
The level of opportunity may vary from state to state depending on the terms of the peace treaty 
or what actions the post-conflict regime takes, but the inherent infrastructure needed to conduct a 
rebellion remains. Therefore, in order to predict civil war recurrence, the focus must be on 
motive. As a general statement, citizens are motivated to rebel by a desire to effect change. If 
citizen involvement in the regime is high, then individuals will be able act within existing 
political institutions. If citizen involvement in the regime is low, then dissatisfied individuals 
may have no nonviolent means for change. While not explicitly stated, citizen involvement in the 
post-conflict regime is key to the incentives Walter (2004) identified for citizens to rebel (see 
“Why civil wars recur” in the Literature Review). 
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 When considering incentives to rebel, the perceived level of citizen involvement may be 
more important than the actual level of citizen involvement, and would have to be quantified 
differently (such as through polls rather than voting statistics). And both perceived and actual 
citizen involvement may be different than the theoretical level established in the state’s 
constitution or laws. For this reason, citizen involvement is defined as the general perception that 
an individual citizen has the ability to effect change by acting within established political 
institutions.  
Citizen Involvement and Civil War Recurrence 
 When examining civil war recurrence through the lens of citizen involvement, there are 
two key thresholds to consider: the perceived level of citizen involvement in order to effectively 
rebel, and the perceived level of citizen involvement to effect change within the current regime. 
This presumes that there is a desire to affect change in the first place, but most citizens in post-
conflict states experience some level of hardship simply as a result of the destructive forces of 
war. The equation is simple: if the collective perceived level of citizen involvement within the 
regime is higher than the level needed to effectively rebel, civil war will not recur. If the reverse 
is true, then civil war will recur. Assuming that different regime types can be ranked according to 
the level of citizen involvement, with each type being assigned a relative threshold, and there is 
one universal threshold at which citizens can rebel, then a few conclusions can be made: 1) a 
regime with the highest level of citizen involvement has the lowest risk of recurrence, and vice 
versa; 2) there will be a clear distinction between which regime types are able to avoid 
recurrence and which are not, from which the ranking of the universal rebellion threshold can be 
inferred; 3) the relative positions of each regime type’s threshold can be inferred according to it’s 
collective success at avoiding recurrence. 
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Citizen Involvement and Regime Type 
 Citizen involvement is also an important dimension because it can be used to evaluate 
and rank all of the regime subtypes along a theoretical scale of the greatest level of perceived 
citizen involvement to the lowest level. The most important regime subtypes for my analysis are 
those within the democratic and authoritarian categories, as anocracies – or weak democracies 
and weak autocracies – are universally regarded as prone to civil war recurrence. The inverted-U 
relationship between level of democracy and likelihood of civil war is well established, which 
results in an equally lower level of civil conflict in consistent democratic and authoritarian 
regimes compared to the less consistent anocracies. However, this relationship is not as widely 
established for states that have already experienced a civil war. Whether democratic institutions 
in post-conflict states contribute to a lower or higher risk for recurrence is still up for debate, and 
this paper aims to contribute to that debate. 
 The nebulous position of anocracies along the scale of citizen involvement can be 
explained by the motive vs opportunity framework. I previously established that opportunity 
exists to some degree in all post-conflict states, leaving the motive as my primary concern since 
both need to be present for a state to be at risk. However, governments can control how much 
opportunity rebels have to some degree. This level of opportunity would then be more relevant to 
predicting conflict in the short term, while motive as explained through the dimension of citizen 
involvement is more relevant in the long term. Under this framework, democratic regimes would 
have high opportunity but low motive, authoritarian regimes would have low opportunity but 
high motive, and anocracies would have medium opportunity and medium motive. Given that in 
post-conflict states opportunity will be higher across the board, motive should remain the more 
significant predictor of civil war recurrence. 
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Within the category of democratic regime types are Consensus, Mixed, and Majoritarian, 
and within the category of authoritarian regime types are Boss, Strongman, Machine, and Junta. 
Anocracies can be categorized as leaning democratic or leaning authoritarian. Due to a number 
of key elements in a consensus democracy such as proportional representation election systems, 
decentralized government for greater local power, and a balance of power between the branches 
of government and political parties that makes cooperation necessary, I argue that consensus 
democracies have a higher level of perceived citizen involvement than majoritarian democracies. 
An individual’s vote matters more in a consensus system, but any vote matters more than having 
none at all. Consensus democracies therefore hold the top rank, with mixed and then majoritarian 
democracies just below.  
In authoritarian regimes, citizen involvement becomes less a function of elections and 
more a function of how easily citizens can influence policy by becoming a part of the 
government. In a personalistic regime, positions of power are limited to the leader’s family, 
friends and cronies – those the leader regards as the most loyal. Nonpersonalistic regimes allow 
for dissent within the government, and positions of power are open to citizens so long as they are 
part of the military or party. Therefore, the nonpersonalistic Machine and Junta regimes rank 
below majoritarian democracies, with the personalistic Boss and Strongman ranking lowest in 
terms of citizen involvement. 
Summary 
 The goal of this thesis is to discover which regime type – or more broadly, which group 
of political institutions – is best able to prevent civil war recurrence in the fragile post-conflict 
state. My hypothesis states that consensus democracies will be most successful at preventing 
conflict recurrence, due to the higher level of perceived citizen involvement in consensus 
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democracies. The philosophy of power-sharing that defines consensus political institutions is 
what allows for this high level of citizen involvement, and a greater perception that an 
individual’s vote matters, compared to a majoritarian system. This hypothesis rests on the 
assumption that regime type is a significant predictor of civil war recurrence. 
 I also argue that more broadly, the integration of any consensus elements into a post-
conflict state’s government will decrease the likelihood of conflict recurrence. Most democracies 
use a mix of consensus and majoritarian traits, rather than belonging entirely to one category. 
Even on a smaller scale, consensus political institutions can contribute to the success of the new 
government. 
Hypotheses 
 H1: Autocracies are more likely than Democracies to experience civil war recurrence 
 H2: Among Autocracies and Closed Anocracies, the Strongman and Boss regimes are 
more likely to experience civil war recurrence than Junta or Machine regimes. 
 H3: Among Democracies and Open Anocracies, Majoritarian regimes are more likely to 
experience civil war recurrence than Consensus regimes 
 H4: Among Democracies and Open Anocracies, a higher consensus score is correlated 
with a lower likelihood of civil war recurrence. 
Data 
 In order to test my hypothesis I created a new dataset of countries’ post-civil war political 
regime types. The dataset is organized into country-year units and is limited to countries that 
have experienced at least one civil war since 1946, as determined by the Correlates of War 
Intrastate Conflict dataset. The years included for each country are from 1946, or the year the 
state was established, until 2007, or the year the country collapsed. I chose 1946 as the starting 
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date due to the new international context after the end of World War II, and the greater 
availability of data. As the dataset is organized by country-year, each observation has a unique 
ID composed of its numeric country code and the year. For example, Cuba in 1950 has the 
unique ID 401950. Each observation has basic identifying variables such as the country code 
using several standards, country name, and year. For the purpose of continuity in my analysis, I 
am using the Gleditsch & Ward country codes, a modification of the COW codes that keeps the 
same code for states like the USSR and Russia. 
 The core of the dataset was created by merging the Correlates of War Intra-State Wars 
v.4.0 dataset and the Polity IV dataset. While the Polity IV data was already in country-year 
units, the COW dataset was organized with individual wars as the unit of analysis. In the COW 
dataset, I excluded all observations that had a start year less than 1946, had a war type of 
regional internal (6) or intercommunal (7) as these were not strictly civil wars, and where sideA, 
sideB, or ccode were coded as -8 (not applicable) as these represented observations that repeated 
an existing conflict but from the perspective of an intervening force. The remaining observations 
were then reformatted into country-year units in SAS. In order to deal with multiple wars 
occurring within the same country-year unit, each variable taken from the CoW dataset has a 
version 1 and 2, where the variable2 refers to the data for the second war if applicable. In the 
Polity IV dataset, I excluded all observations that had a year less than 1946, and a country code 
that did not exist in the modified COW dataset. 
 The dependent variable that I am measuring is civil war recurrence. This is measured by 
creating a dummy variable for each country-year, where a code of 1 means there was at least one 
civil war in that country-year, and a code of 0 means there were no civil wars that country-year. 
My dataset includes multiple ways to measure this: I use the Correlates of War dataset, but the 
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coding from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset in country-year format is also included, 
reduced to both a dummy variable measuring if there was a political conflict resulting in a civil 
war classification (1,000 deaths) and a dummy variable measuring if there was any political 
conflict (resulting in at least 25 deaths). The independent variable I am measuring is regime type. 
Basic regime type information is drawn from the Polity IV dataset; a Polity score of -10 to -6 is 
an Autocracy, a Polity score of -5 to 0 is a Closed Anocracy, a Polity score of 1 to 5 is an Open 
Anocracy, a Polity score of 6 to 10 is a Democracy, and a Polity code of -66, -77, or -88 is 
treated as a Transitional regime. Each regime is also assigned a specific subtype. Data on the 
authoritarian subtypes are based on Weeks’ classification for her book Dictators at War and 
Peace, and data on the democratic subtypes are based on the key institutions Reynolds identified 
in his book Designing democracy in a dangerous world. I have also added a number of World 
Development Indicators as my control variables: GDP per capita percent growth, infant mortality 
rate, and life expectancy. 
Constructing the Majoritarian-Consensus Scale for Democracies 
 For each country-year that had a Polity score of 1 or greater (Open Anocracies and 
Democracies), I generated a score from 0-10, with 0 being the most Majoritarian and 10 being 
the most Consensual. I based my scoring system off of the four key institutions identified in 
Reynolds’ Designing Democracy: Legislative Type, Federalism & Decentralization, Executive 
Inclusion (or Constraints on the Executive), and Executive Type. The data necessary for 
measuring each of these four indicators was drawn from the Quality of Government Standard 
Dataset, which is itself a massive compilation of all other known datasets relevant to government 
and organized in country-year format. 
 The legislative type indicator (i1) was calculated by adding the base institutional score (0-
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2) to the ENPP (effective number of parliamentary parties). A base score of 0 means the 
legislative election system was majoritarian, and had a system of plurality or absolute majority. 
A base score of 1 means the election system was mixed, and had a system of Mixed Independent. 
A base score of 2 means the election system was Proportional, and had a system of List PR or 
Single Transferable Vote. The total score was calculated by dividing the ENPP for the most 
recent election by 10 to reach a range of 0-.99, with the few cases of an ENPP greater than 10 
(such as Lebanon) being set at .99. The final indicator score had a theoretical range of 0-2.99. 
This score was then multiplied by 3.333 to reach a standardized weighted score of 0-10. A 
variety of sources were used to make these calculations, but the primary source was Golder & 
Bormann’s Democratic Electoral Systems dataset. 
 The federalism indicator (i2) was calculated by taking the base score of 0-2, and once again 
standardizing to a range of 0-10 by multiplying by 5. A base score of 0 means unitary, a base 
score of 1 means mixed, and a base score of 2 means federal.  A variety of sources from the QoG 
dataset was used, but due to a lack of variables measuring federalism a large number of cases I 
used Gerring & Thacker’s scoring of Unitarism, which averaged together the degree of 
federalism (0-2) and the degree of bicameralism (0-2). While a score of 0 still means a unitary 
system (which rated a 2 in Gerring and Thacker’s dataset), and a score of 2 means a federal 
system, the scores in between (of .5, 1, or 1.5) are less strict. But as bicameralism is still a 
measure of federalism and using these scores allowed for more information to be included, I 
decided to use this data. 
 The Executive Inclusion indicator (i3) was measured by adding together the base coalition 
score to the POLCON3 variable, from Henisz’s Political Constraints Index Dataset. The base 
score was taken by looking at the coalition type of the government, as more parties in a coalition 
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and thus providing opposition indicates greater restraint on the executive’s power to do anything 
unilaterally, thus making the system more consensual. I used data from the Dataset of Political 
Institutions (found in the QoG dataset) to calculate the coalition score. A score of 0 means that 
there was 1 government party, and no opposition parties. A score of 1 means there was more 
than 1 government party, but no opposition parties. A score of 2 means there was 1 government 
party, and at least one opposition party. A score of 3 means there was more than 1 government 
party, and at least one opposition party. A coalition (of more than one government party) means 
greater cooperation, and the presence of opposition parties indicates even more limits on what 
the government parties can unilaterally do. The POLCON3 variable ranges from a theoretical 
score of 0-1, with 1 indicating the most constraint on any one political actor being able to enact 
policy changes. Together, the total indicator score ranges from 0-4. This was then multiplied by 
2.5 to reach a standardized score of 0-10. 
 The Executive Type indicator (i4) was measured in a similar way as the legislative type. A 
base score of 0-2 was calculated by determining the executive type, as measured by Golder & 
Bormann’s dataset or other sources in the QoG dataset, and adding the effective number of 
presidential candidates (enpres) once again divided by 10. A base score of 0 means a presidential 
system (or an unelected executive), a base score of 1 means a mixed system (with both a 
president and a prime minister), and a base score of 2 means a parliamentary system. The enpres 
variable was divided by 10 to have a theoretical range of 0-.99, and added to the base score to 
reach a range of 0-3. This score was then standardized to a range of 0-10 by multiplying it by 
3.33. 
Categorizing Democracies 
 I created two final consensus scores for categorizing into the democratic regime subtypes. 
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The first final score was calculated by adding together all four of the standardized scores, and 
then dividing by the number of non-missing indicators. A variable measuring the accuracy of 
each score is present as well, with a score of 5 meaning all 4 variables were taken into account to 
a score of 1 meaning no variables were present to be taken into account (and thus resulting in a 
missing final score). These final scores have a theoretical range of 0 to 10, with 10 being the 
most consensual. Each score was then fitted into a category of Majoritarian (with a score of 0-4), 
Mixed (4.01-5.99), or Consensus (6-10). 
 The second final score was calculated by adding together all three of the standardized 
scores except the Federalism (i2) score, and then dividing by the number of non-missing 
indicators. The final scores have a theoretical range of 0 to 10, and are arranged into the three 
categories by the same scoring system. There are several reasons for establishing this second 
score. The first is that federalism is thematically different from the other three indicators. 
Legislative Type, Executive Inclusion (Constraint), and Executive Type all address Lijphart’s 
first Executive-Parties dimension, failing to measure only the fifth criteria of interest group 
systems. The Federalism indicator, however, addresses Lijphart’s second Federal-Unitary 
dimension. While it does measure the main two criteria of this dimension (federal vs unitary and 
unicameral vs bicameral), it does not address the other three criteria (constitutional flexibility, 
judicial review, and central bank independence). The second reason is that the quality of data for 
the federalism indicator is poorer than for the other indicators. It has the most cases of missing 
observations, has less variability than the other indicators, and is less precise as some 
observations include bicameralism as a factor and others do not. Furthermore, for the second 
version of the final score, there are no observations after a country’s first civil war in which the 
score is missing more than one indicator. The third reason is that the primary source of the 
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federalism data, Gerring and Thacker’s dataset for their theory of Centripetalism, already 
suggests that a unitary system is better at preventing civil war recurrence than a federal system. 
For these three reasons, I believe that it is important to test both measures of the democratic 
regime subtypes. 
Categorizing Autocracies 
 For each country-year that had a Polity score of 0 or less, I used Slater’s typology and 
Weeks’ methodology to determine if the autocracy was personalistic or not and militaristic or 
not, forming the four key categories. A fifth category of monarchies was also included, as 
autocracies that were considered monarchies were not ranked along the personalistic or 
militaristic dichotomies. In order to assign each country-year to one of these five categories 
(Strongman, Junta, Boss, Machine, or Monarchy), five dummy variables were created. For the 
personalistic dummy variable, a value of 1 was assigned for each country-year with a 
personalistic regime. For the non-personalistic dummy variable, a value of 1 was assigned for 
each country-year with a non-personalistic regime. The same rules applied for the militaristic and 
non-militaristic dummy variables. A regime that is considered a monarchy had a 1 for the 
monarchy variable, and a zero for the other for dummy variables. The four remaining categories 
were created such that if a country-year had a value of 1 for both the personalistic and militaristic 
variables, it received a 1 for the Strongman category; a country-year with a 1 for the non-
personalistic and militaristic variables received a 1 for the Junta category; a country-year with a 
1 for the personalistic and non-militaristic variables received a 1 for the Boss category; and a 
country-year with a 1 for the non-personalistic and non-militaristic variables received a 1 for the 
Machine category.  
 I used Weeks’ most recent data (2015) as my primary source of data for these categories, 
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and then supplemented it with Geddes’ most recent data (2014). Weeks does not have data for 
years after 2000, and places many autocracies under the catch-all “other” category when there is 
not enough information or the regime is a monarchy. Geddes includes data for years up to 2010, 
and codes each regime according to the four binary variables of party-based, military, personal, 
and monarchical, with overlap allowed between the first three variables. When there was data 
missing for a country-year from both Weeks’ and Geddes’ data, I used variables from the 
compiled Quality of Government dataset that I had used in ranking the democracies. I used the 
variables from the Polity dataset and Geddes’ dataset to expand the values for one country-year 
to the missing row preceding or following it if the regime had not changed. Combined, these 
methods resulted in most Autocracies and Closed Anocracies being categorized. 
The 10 Exclusive Regime Categories 
 Every country-year unit in the dataset, a total of 3,262 observations, has a value of 1 in a 
single category and a value of 0 in the nine other categories of regime subtypes. Observations 
with a Polity score of 1 to 10 are categorized as a Majoritarian Democracy, Mixed Democracy, 
or Consensus Democracy. Observations with a Polity score of 0 to -10 are categorized as a 
Strongman Autocracy, Junta Autocracy, Boss Autocracy, Machine Autocracy, or Monarchy. 
Observations with a new and/or unstable regime, identified by a Polity score of -66 
(Interruption), -77 (Anarchy), or -88 (Transition), are categorized as an Unstable Regime. 
Observations with a Polity score of 0 or less, but no authoritarian category, or a Polity score of 1 
or greater, but no democratic category, are categorized as Missing. The following figure details 
how the observations are distributed with the categorical breakdown shown in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1: Breakdown of Regime Subtype 
Total Country-Year Observations: 3,626 *using 2nd score 
Consensus Democracy: 109 207 
Mixed Democracy: 533 706 
Majoritarian Democracy: 562 282 
Monarchy: 312 
Strongman Autocracy: 531 
Junta Autocracy: 292 
Boss Autocracy: 522 
Machine Autocracy: 401 
Unstable Regime: 298 








I used a logistic regression analysis to test my hypotheses, with the independent and 
control variables lagged2 by one year in order to prevent any reverse causality from interfering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Note that in the dataset, this lagged effect was created by leading the dependent variables 
(civilwaryr) and the peace variables (peace, peace2, peace3) – these leading variables are 
identified by the prefix “t1_”.	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with the results. All models are run twice – once without any control variables beyond the 
measure of peace duration (as well as peace squared & cubed, although these are not included in 
most of the results tables) and once with the additional control variables.  
In order to test my hypotheses I ran 5 base models using Stata’s logit command. 
Unfortunately, these models yielded only a few significant results. However, the general trend 
that the models revealed do provide some support for my hypotheses. I found support against my 
first hypothesis, that Democracies were more successful than Autocracies at preventing civil war 
recurrence, although this result was only significant once at the lowest level. I did find that 
Closed Anocracies were significantly correlated with recurrence. I also found some support for 
my second hypotheses. Strongman regimes were the only subtype to be significantly correlated 
with recurrence, and were as bad as Unstable regimes in that respect. However, I predicted that 
the personalistic regimes would be the most likely to result in recurrence, and my fifth model 
shows that the personalistic factor is not a significant factor in civil war recurrence. Additionally, 
the Boss regime type is not significantly correlated with civil war recurrence. In regards to my 
third hypotheses, I was unable to find any significant results. Furthermore, the coefficients 
suggested opposite results depending on which Democracy scoring method was used, though 
neither were significant. Lastly, I was unable to find support for my fourth hypothesis. 
Federalism was the only indicator with a significant result, and showed that a more federalist 
regime was correlated with a higher likelihood of civil war recurrence. The other three indicators 
were correlated with a lower likelihood of recurrence, but not at a significant level. Furthermore, 
neither of the democratic scoring methods had significant results. 
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Model 1: The Regime Ranking System 
 The first model acts as a general test for the ranking system laid out in the three 
hypotheses. I coded the regime subtypes as: 0 = Unstable, 1 = Strongman, 2 = Boss, 3 = Junta, 4 
= Machine, 5 = Monarchy, 6 = Majoritarian, 7 = Mixed, and 8 = Consensus. The model was 
tested multiple times with variations as to the independent variable, with the democracies being 
categorized by method one (including the federalism indicator) and method two (excluding the 
federalism indicator), and with the control variables being included or excluded (the variable 
measuring the years since the previous civil war, peace duration, is always included). 
TABLE 2: Model 1 
Variables Dem Score 1, 
Control excluded 
Dem Score 2, 
Control excluded 
Dem Score 1, 
Control included 
Dem Score 2, 
Control included 
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(% growth) 




















     
# of observations 1657 1657 1304 1304 
Log Likelihood -270.08558 -268.83865 -176.2343 -176.01371 
Pseudo R2 0.0481 0.0525 0.0675 0.0687 
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
*** p < .005, ** p < .05, * p < .1 
 
 Model 1 provides general support for my hypothesis, as the higher the ranking of the 
regime subtypes, the less likely a country is to experience civil war recurrence. This remains true 
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for both methods of ranking the democracy. However, the results are no longer significant after 
the control variables are included in the analysis. When the same four tests were used with the 
dependent variable measured by PRIO, where all political conflict with 25 or more deaths were 
counted, the regime subtype had no significant effect. The next models will dig deeper to 
determine what is driving this relationship. 
Model 2: Regime Types 
 The next model looks at the five broad regime types. Once again the independent variables 
have been lagged, and were drawn from the COW data. 
TABLE 3: Model 2 




































































     
# of observations 1657 1304 1498 1218 
Log Likelihood -268.22915 -170.29336 -219.23098 -151.03093 
Pseudo R2 0.0546 0.0990 .0.0569 0.0886 
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
*** p < .005, ** p < .05, * p < .1 
 
	   	   Jordan	  	   33	  
 As is to be expected, Transitional regimes are significantly worse at preventing conflict 
recurrence. Among the established governments, Closed Anocracies are the most likely to result 
in civil war recurrence. Although Transitional governments and Closed Anocracies were the only 
regime types with consistent significant results, when the control variables were included 
Democracies and Open Anocracies were significantly correlated with recurrence. This seems to 
imply that out of all the basic regime types, Autocracies are better able to prevent civil war 
recurrence. These results are in line with the literature predicting that Anocracies are the most 
prone to civil war recurrence; however, these results reveal the important distinction that this is 
most significantly true for Closed Anocracies.  
Model 3: Regime Subtypes  
 The next model breaks down the regime types into the respective subtypes. As the previous 
model used autocracies as a baseline, this model uses the Machine subtype as the baseline. There 
are variations of the model to account for the two democracy scoring methods and inclusion of 
control variables. Model 3 reveals that it is the strong likelihood for Strongman and Unstable 
regimes to result in civil war recurrence that drives the success of the regime ranking system 
from Model 1.  
 No other regime type significantly predicts civil war recurrence, though it is worth noting 
that under the first Democracy scoring system, Majoritarian regimes seem to be the most 
successful at preventing recurrence, followed by Mixed and then Consensus regimes. Under the 
second scoring system, Consensus regimes seem to be the most successful, although neither of 
these are significant results. Interestingly, some of the autocratic types such as the Machine, 
Junta, and Monarchy seem to be more successful than some Democracy types in the different 
model variations, although again this is not a significant result. After including the control 
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variables, the Strongman and Unstable regime types are no longer significant predictors of civil 
war recurrence. 
TABLE 4: Model 3 
Variables Dem Score 1, 
Control excluded 
Dem Score 2, 
Control excluded 
Dem Score 1, 
Control included 
Dem Score 2, 
Control included 
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# of observations 1657 1657 1241 1241 
Log Likelihood -265.97362 -264.43866 -170.8277 -170.77419 
Pseudo R2 0.0626 0.0680 0.0857 0.0860 
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
*** p < .005, ** p < .05, * p < .1 
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Model 4: Consensus indicators 
 The previous model revealed that changing the way Democracies are scored by excluding 
the federalism indicator seemed to change the success of the democratic subtypes in preventing 
civil war recurrence. Model 4 looks at each of these indicators to see which aspects of a 
consensus government changes its success at preventing recurrence, as well as both versions of 
the final Democracy score. 
TABLE 5: Model 4 (.1-.7) 
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# of obs. 667 662 615 667 603 603 
Log Likeli. -73.505589 -72.265443 -65.5518 -74.482117 -65.44117 -68.579933 
Pseudo R2 0.0715 0.0856 0.0704 0.0591 0.0681 .0859 
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
*** p < .005, ** p < .05, * p < .1 
 
 The only indicator with any significance is i2, which reveals that a higher Federalism score 
is more likely to result in civil war recurrence. The other indicators show that a higher consensus 
level is less likely to result in recurrence, though these results do not reach the .1 significance 
level. As a result of removing the federalism indicator from the democracy score, the democracy 
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score is still not significant, at p=.247. These results are not enough to provide support for my 
last hypothesis. 
Model 5: Autocracy factors 
 This model focuses on Autocracies and Closed Anocracies, and considers the two factors 
determining the (non-Monarchy) Autocratic regime subtypes. The only significant result from 
Model 3 was that Strongman regimes were a significant predictor of civil war recurrence. In the 
same way that the previous model looked at what factors drove the Democratic rankings, this 
model looks at how the personalistic and militaristic factors drive the Autocratic rankings. 
TABLE 6: Model 5 
Variables Control excluded Control included 
















Life expectancy  -.081** 
(.033) 






   
# of observations 802 611 
Log Likelihood -146.13069 -92.044245 
Pseudo R2 0.0447 0.0607 
Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
*** p < .005, ** p < .05, * p < .1 
 
  Model 5 has no significant results. When the control variables are excluded, the 
significance of the personalistic factor is p=.143, and the significance of the militaristic factor is 
p=.107 – both just barely beyond the .1 significance level that would indicate both more 
	   	   Jordan	  	   37	  
personalistic regimes and militaristic regimes contribute to a higher likelihood of conflict 
recurrence.  
Conclusion 
 The goal of this thesis was to find the best possible type of regime for a state recovering 
from a civil war, in order to avoid being plagued by recurrent conflict as most states are. I 
assumed that there would be a best type to model a new government after, and theorized that a 
consensus democracy would fulfill that role. However, my findings show that in terms of regime 
type, it is less important to match the “best” regime type and more important to avoid the “worst” 
regime type.  
My models resulted in few significant results, but did consistently show that Strongman 
regimes, which are both personalistic and militaristic, are the worst regime type at preventing 
civil war recurrence. Strongman regimes performed just as badly as Unstable regimes – those 
coded by Polity IV as being in anarchy, interruption, or transition. Further analysis indicated that 
personalistic and militaristic regimes might be correlated with civil war recurrence, albeit not 
quite at an significant level. 
 I was unable to find support for my primary theory – that consensus regimes would best 
prevent civil war recurrence. Using the four institutions identified in Reynolds’ Designing 
Democracy, I found that the three institutions relating to Lijphart’s Executive-Parties dimension 
(Legislative Type, Executive Type, and Executive Inclusion/Constraint) did not significantly 
impact the likelihood of conflict recurrence; however, the federalism institution, which relates to 
Lijphart’s Federal-Unitary dimension, was significantly correlated with civil war recurrence. 
 While my analyses do answer some basic questions and start to accomplish my initial 
goal of determining which regime types and institutional factors are the best and worst at 
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preventing civil war recurrence, there is still a lot of work to do. My analysis was limited by the 
availability of data – especially for the federalism indicator. In order to expand upon these initial 
results, I would analyze how each of the 10 factors Lijphart identifies in classifying a consensus 
regime effects that regime’s likelihood of civil war recurrence. Furthermore, I would also like to 
investigate how a regime change would influence a state’s likelihood to re-enter civil war. For 
instance, if a state went from a Boss regime to a Majoritarian regime, would that result in a lower 
risk of conflict? Would a transition from a Consensus to a Majoritarian regime result in a higher 
risk of conflict? Do such transitions tend to have an immediate or delayed effect on conflict 
recurrence? These are the questions I would like to later explore in order to find a more nuanced 
and hopefully significant answer to my original inspiration for this thesis. Working on both a 
more nuanced dataset and a different level of analysis that focuses more on how regimes change 
over time rather than what they are immediately prior to conflict would help immensely in 
providing a solid recommendation to policy-makers and civil war mediators, as well as nationals 
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